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Abstract
Bypass rewiring improves connectivity and robustness of networks against removal of nodes including failures
and attacks. A concept of bypass rewiring on directed networks is proposed, and random bypass rewiring
on infinite directed random networks is analytically and numerically investigated with simulations. As a
result, random bypass rewiring makes infinite directed (undirected) random networks extremely robust for
arbitrary occupation probabilities if and only if in-degree of every node except a fixed number of nodes is
equal to the out-degree (every node except a finite number of nodes has even degree); bypass rewiring makes
the percolation threshold 0. Consequently, a finite network has a strongly connected spanning subnetwork
which has an Eulerian path or cycle if and only if there exists an way of bypass rewiring to make the finite
network extremely robust for every combination of removed nodes; Eulerian networks are extremely robust
for every combination of removed nodes.
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1. Introduction
Many systems in real-world (the Internet, electric power grids, and others) can be represented by complex
networks with many nodes (vertices) and links (edges) between nodes [1, 2, 3]. Complex networks are
relatively robust to failures or errors (random removal of nodes) but fragile and vulnerable to intended
attacks (targeted removal of nodes in decreasing order of degree from the highest degree); a network is
fragmented into smaller components when nodes are deleted [4, 5, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Even though
there are various mitigation methods attempted to improve robustness of networks, they have technical,
economic, or geographical problems and limitations when applied to real-world systems [13, 14, 15, 16, 17].
From the practical point of view, bypass rewiring is a technicaly, economically, and geographically realistic
mitigation method against removal of nodes including failures and attacks because bypass-rewiring the links
of a removed node under failures or attacks is easy and simple work; an engineer or equipment can easily
and simply rewire cables (links) of a router (node) and repeat the signals directly when the router does not
work under failures or attack or is under repair [18].
In this paper, we propose a concept of bypass rewiring on directed networks and give generalized results
on not only infinite networks but also real-world networks with a finite number of nodes. In Section 2, a
concept of bypass rewired is proposed. In Section 3, we derive analytical and simulation results of random
bypass rewiring on infinite directed random networks. In Section 4, the results in Section 3 and [18] with a
real-world example, the Internet topology, are discussed and generalized results on infinite random networks
and finite networks are derived from the discussion. In Section 5, we summarize the paper and comment on
further work.
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2. A concept of bypass rewiring on directed networks
We propose a concept of bypass rewiring on directed networks. A node in Fig. 1(a) is removed by failures
or attacks and turns into the removed nodes in Fig. 1(b). Bypass rewiring on a directed network is to directly
connect each pair of in-links and out-links of the removed node like Fig. 1(c). Each pair of in-links and
out-links for rewiring can be chosen in various ways including random bypass rewiring by which each pair
of in-links and out-links of the removed nodes are randomly chosen. If in-degree kin is larger (smaller) than
out-degree kout of the removed node, kin − kout in-links (kout − kin out-links) remain open.
3. Random bypass rewiring on infinite directed random networks
3.1. Analytical results
Using double generating functions based on the generating function formalism introduced in [5, 19, 8,
12, 20], we define
G0,0(x, y) =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
pj,kx
jyk, (1)
Hin,1(x) =
∞∑
k=0
hin,kx
k, (2a)
Hout,1(x) =
∞∑
k=0
hout,kx
k, (2b)
for
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
jpj,k =
∞∑
j=0
jpin,j = 〈j〉 =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
kpj,k =
∞∑
k=0
kpout,k = 〈k〉, (3)
where pj,k is the probability that a randomly chosen node has in-degree j and out-degree k, and hin,k
(hout,k) is the probability that a randomly chosen link originates from (leads to) a small in-component
(out-component) which has k nodes. Eq. (3) is naturally assumed since average in-degree 〈j〉 and average
out-degree 〈k〉 are equal on directed networks. Since nodes of the giant strongly connected component do
not belong to any small in- and out-component which has a fixed number of nodes on an infinite directed
random networks, the probability that a randomly chosen node belongs to the giant strongly connected
component is
Ss =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
pj,kφj,k(1− u
j
in − u
k
out + u
j
inu
k
out), (4)
for
Hin,1(x) =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)pj,k+1
〈k〉
{1− φj,k+1 + φj,k+1[Hin,1(x)]
j}, (5a)
Hout,1(x) =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
(j + 1)pj+1,k
〈j〉
{1− φj+1,k + φj+1,k[Hout,1(x)]
k}. (5b)
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uin (uout) is the average probability that there exists no path from (to) the giant strongly connected com-
ponent to (from) the node from (to) which a randomly chosen link originates (leads) where uin and uout are
the smallest non-negative real solutions of
uin = Hin,1(1) = f1(uin) =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
kpj,k(1− φj,k + φj,ku
j
in)
〈k〉
, (6a)
uout = Hout,1(1) = f2(uout) =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
jpj,k(1− φj,k + φj,ku
k
out)
〈j〉
, (6b)
respectively, and φj,k is the occupation probability that a randomly chosen node with in-degree j and
out-degree k is not removed; the average occupation probability is defined as
φ =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
pj,kφj,k. (7)
From now on, we formulate the equations corresponding to Eqs. (5a), (5b), (6a), and (6b) with considering
random bypass rewiring. Based on the idea seen in Fig. 2 which illustrates random bypass rewiring on an
infinite directed random network,
Hin,1(x) =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
kpj,k
〈k〉
{
φj,k[Hin,1(x)]
j + (1− φj,k)
[
min(
j
k
, 1)Hin,1(x) + max(0,
k − j
k
)
]}
, (8a)
Hout,1(x) =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
jpj,k
〈j〉
{
φj,k[Hout,1(x)]
k + (1− φj,k)
[
min(
k
j
, 1)Hout,1(x) + max(0,
j − k
j
)
]}
, (8b)
uin = Hin,1(1) = f3(uin) =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
kpj,k
〈k〉
{
φj,ku
j
in + (1− φj,k)
[
min(
j
k
, 1)uin +max(0,
k − j
k
)
]}
, (9a)
uout = Hout,1(1) = f4(uout) =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
jpj,k
〈j〉
{
φj,ku
k
out + (1− φj,k)
[
min(
k
j
, 1)uout +max(0,
j − k
j
)
]}
,
(9b)
are derived.
In the case of undirected networks, the average probability that a randomly chosen link is not connected
to the giant component is
u =
∞∑
k=0
qkφk+1u
k + u
∞∑
k=0
qk(1 − φk+1) + (1− u)
∞∑
k=0
p2k+1(1− φ2k+1)∑∞
k′=1 k
′pk′
, (10)
for qk = (k + 1)pk/
∑∞
k=0 kpk [18].
The self-consistent equations like Eqs. (6a), (6b), (9a), and (9b) can be solved as follows by the fixed-point
iteration [21]. Iterating
uin,i+1 = f1(uin,i), (11a)
uout,i+1 = f2(uout,i), (11b)
vin,i+1 = f3(vin,i), (12a)
vout,i+1 = f4(vout,i), (12b)
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for uin,0 = uout,0 = vin,0 = vout,0 = 0, uin,i, uout,i, vin,i, and vout,i approaches to u¯in, u¯out, v¯in, and v¯out,
respectively, as i goes to infinity, for
u¯in = f1(u¯in), (13a)
u¯out = f2(u¯out), (13b)
v¯in = f3(v¯in), (14a)
v¯out = f4(v¯out). (14b)
Since
f1(uin) ≥ f3(uin), (15a)
f2(uout) ≥ f4(uout), (15b)
hold from uinmin(
j
k
, 1) + max(0, k−j
k
) ≤ 1 and uoutmin(
k
j
, 1) + max(0, j−k
j
) ≤ 1 for j, k ≥ 0 and 0 ≤
uin, uout ≤ 1,
uin,i ≥ vin,i, (16a)
uout,i ≥ vout,i, (16b)
are derived for all i from Eqs. (11a), (11b), (12a), and (12b). Therefore, Ss on an infinite directed random
network with random bypass rewiring is always equal to or larger than without random bypass rewiring; the
percolation threshold on an infinite directed random network with random bypass rewiring is always equal
to or smaller than without random bypass rewiring.
For even degree infinite undirected random networks; that is,
p2k+1 = 0, (17)
the probability that a randomly chosen node belongs to the giant component is
S =
∞∑
k=0
pkφk(1− u
k) =
∞∑
k=0
pkφk = φ, (18)
since Eq. (10) is reduced to
u =
∞∑
k=0
qkφk+1u
k + u
∞∑
k=0
qk(1 − φk+1), (19)
and u = 0 is the smallest non-negative real solutions of Eq. (19) [18]. Similarly, if every node, except a fixed
number of nodes, on infinite directed random networks has in-degree equal to the out-degree; that is,
pj,k = 0 for j 6= k, (20)
holds, Eqs. (9a) and (9b) are reduced to
uin =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
kpj,k
〈k〉
[
φj,ku
j
in + (1− φj,k)uin
]
, (21a)
uout =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
jpj,k
〈j〉
[
φj,ku
k
out + (1 − φj,k)uout
]
. (21b)
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Therefore, the smallest non-negative real solutions of Eqs. (21a) and (21b) are uin = uout = 0 for which
Eq. (4) corresponds to
Ss =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
pj,kφj,k = φ, (22)
from Eq. (7). Therefore, Ss is equal to φ, and the percolation threshold is 0 on an infinite directed random
network with random bypass rewiring for Eq. (20); that is, infinite directed random networks are extremely
robust with random bypass rewiring for arbitrary φj,k where Eq. (20) holds.
3.2. Simulation results
To simulate attacks, a node with the highest product of in-degree and out-degree is firstly removed and
nodes are removed one by one in decreasing order of the product of in-degree and out-degree while randomly
chosen nodes are removed one by one in the case of failures (φj,k = φ). For a numerical simulation of attacks
for Eqs. (6a), (6b), (9a), and (9b),
φj,k =


1,
∑
{j′k′≤jk} pj′,k′ < φ
φ−
∑
{j′k′≤jk−1} pj′,k′∑
{j′k′=jk} pj′ ,k′
,
∑
{j′k′≤jk−1} pj′,k′ < φ and
∑
{j′k′≤jk} pj′,k′ ≥ φ
0, otherwise
(23)
is set for given average occupation probability φ. In the simulations, in-degree and out-degree of each node
is not recalculated while nodes are removed. To simulate random bypass rewiring, each pair of in-links and
out-links of the removed node are randomly chosen and rewired until there is no pair to match.
The directed network for Fig. 3(b) is randomly generated by in-degree distribution p′in,j = pin,j, out-
degree p′out,k = pout,k, and degree distribution p
′
j,k = 0 for j 6= k where pin,j and pout,k are the in-degree
distribution and the out-degree distribution of the original directed network for Fig. 3(a), respectively. In
other words, the directed network for Fig. 3(b) has a perfect positive correlation between in-degree and
out-degree while the original directed network for Fig. 3(a) has an almost uncorrelated relationship between
in-degree and out-degree.
Figure 3(b) shows that almost all nodes except the removed nodes on the directed network are strongly
connected by random bypass rewiring. The percolation threshold with random bypass rewiring in Fig. 3(b)
is close to 0, while the percolation threshold in Fig. 3(a) is not.
Without random bypass rewiring, the original directed network for Fig. 3(a) is more robust than the
directed network for Fig. 3(b) under attacks while it is not under failures, even though the directed network
for Fig. 3(b) is randomly generated by the same in-degree distribution and out-degree distribution of the
original directed network for Fig. 3(a). On the other hand, with random bypass rewiring, the directed
network for Fig. 3(b) is more robust than the original directed network for Fig. 3(a) against removal of
nodes including failures and attacks. In other words, the directed network for Fig. 3(b) is more robust than
the original directed network for Fig. 3(a) with random bypass rewiring, while the original directed networks
for Fig. 3(a) is more robust than the directed network for Figure 3(b) under attacks without random bypass
rewiring.
4. Discussion
4.1. Generalized results on infinite random networks
From Eq. (18) [Eq. (22)], S [Ss] is equal to φ for Eq. (17) [Eq. (20)] on an infinite undirected [directed]
random network. S [Ss] is always smaller than φ with random bypass rewiring if Eq. (17) [Eq. (20)] does
not hold on an infinite undirected [directed] random network. Therefore, S [Ss] is equal to φ with random
bypass rewiring if and only if Eq. (17) [Eq. (20)] holds on an infinite undirected [directed] random network;
that is, an infinite undirected [directed] random network is extremely robust with random bypass rewiring
if and only if Eq. (17) [Eq. (20)] holds.
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4.2. Generalized results on finite networks
From Eqs. (17) and (20), we recall a necessary condition for the existence of Eulerian cycles on a finite
network [22]. In the case of finite networks, Eq. (17) [Eq. (20)] is interpreted that an undirected [directed]
network has no node with odd degree [different in-degree and out-degree].
From the interpretation of Eqs. (17) and (20), we hypothesized that a finite network has a strongly
connected spanning subnetwork which has an Eulerian path or cycle if and only if there exists an way of
bypass rewiring to strongly connect all nodes except the removed nodes on the finite network for every
combination of removed nodes.
If there exists a set of bypass-rewired links which strongly connect all nodes except the removed nodes
on a finite network for every combination of removed nodes, the finite network has a strongly connected
spanning subnetwork which is composed of the bypass-rewired links and all nodes on the network. Since
each bypass-rewired link (in-link) of a node on the strongly connected spanning subnetwork is paired with
another bypass-rewired link (a bypass-rewired out-link) of the node, the number of the bypass-rewired links
(in-links) of every node is even (is equal to the number of the bypass-rewired out-links); that is, the strongly
connected spanning subnetwork with the bypass-rewired links has an Eulerian path or cycle.
Since the degree (in-degree) of every node, except the starting and ending node of the Eulerian path,
on a strongly connected spanning subnetwork which has an Eulerian path or cycle is even (equal to the
out-degree), each link (in-link) of a node on the Eulerian path or cycle can be bypass-rewired to the next
sequenced link (out-link) [a link (an in-link) of the next sequenced node] of the Eulerian path or cycle which
has sequentially ordered links; that is, there exists at least one way of bypass rewiring to connect all nodes
except the removed nodes on the finite network for every combination of removed nodes. For example, the
i-th link of an Eulerian path or cycle with L links can be bypass-rewired to the (i+1)-th link of the Eulerian
path or cycle for 1 ≤ i < L (and the L-th link of the Eulerian cycle can be bypass-rewired to the 1st link of
the Eulerian cycle since the starting and ending node of an Eulerian cycle are same), as seen in Fig. 4.
In consequence, it is derived that a finite network has a strongly connected spanning subnetwork which
has an Eulerian path or cycle if and only if there exists an way of bypass rewiring to make the finite network
extremely robust for every combination of removed nodes; it is naturally satisfied that Eulerian networks
are extremely robust for every combination of removed nodes.
Even though an way of bypass rewiring based on the sequentially ordered links of a strongly connected
spanning subnetwork which has an Eulerian path or cycle is enough to strongly connect all nodes on the
network, not yet rewired links of each node can be additionally bypass-rewired to improve connectivity.
For example, link F-B and link B-I of node B in Fig. 4 can be additionally bypass-rewired to improve
connectivity.
4.3. A real-world example: the Internet topology
From the consequence derived in Section 4.2, the network in Fig. 4 is extremely robust for every com-
bination of removed nodes since the network has a spanning subnetwork which has an Eulerian path (A-
B-C-D-E-F-G-H-I-J-K-C). To connect all nodes except the broken nodes on the network in Fig. 4 for every
combination of removed nodes, the bypass rewiring policy is defined as follows, based on the sequentially
ordered links of the Eulerian path of the spanning subnetwork. When node B is broken, the 1st link (link
A-B) should be bypass-rewired to the 2nd link (link B-C) and link F-B can be additionally bypass rewired
to link B-I. When node C is broken, the 2nd link (link B-C) should be bypass-rewired to the 3rd link (link
C-D). When node D is broken, the 3rd link (link C-D) should be bypass-rewired to the 4th link (link D-A).
When node A is broken, the 4th link (link D-A) should be bypass-rewired to the 5th link (link A-E). When
node E is broken, the 5th link (link A-E) should be bypass-rewired to the 6th link (link E-F). When node
F is broken, the 6th link (link E-F) should be bypass-rewired to the 7th link (link F-G). When node G is
broken, the 7th link (link F-G) should be bypass-rewired to the 8th link (link G-H). When node H is broken,
the 8th link (link G-H) should be bypass-rewired to the 9th link (link H-I). When node I is broken, the 9th
link (link H-I) should be bypass-rewired to the 10th link (link I-J). When node J is broken, the 10th link
(link I-J) should be bypass-rewired to the 11th link (link J-K). When node K is broken, the 11th link (link
J-K) should be bypass-rewired to 12th link (link K-C).
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The network in Fig. 4 can be fragmented into two parts, a part (node A, B, C, D, E, and F) and
another part (node H, I, and J), when node G and K are broken under failures or attacks or is under repair.
According to the bypass rewiring policy defined above, link F-G would be bypass-rewired to link G-H, link
J-K would be bypass-rewired to link K-C, and then all nodes except the broken node (node G and K) on
the network can be connected.
5. Conclusions
In summary, we have introduced a concept of bypass rewiring on directed networks and conducted ana-
lytical and numerical investigations of random bypass rewiring with double generating function formalisms
and simulations. The results have shown that random bypass rewiring improves robustness of infinite di-
rected (undirected) random networks under removal of nodes including failures and attacks. In particular,
random bypass rewiring guarantees extreme robustness of infinite directed (undirected) random networks
for arbitrary occupation probabilities where in-degree of every node except a fixed number of nodes is equal
to the out-degree (every node except a finite number of nodes has even degree); bypass rewiring makes
the percolation threshold 0. From the above results, we have derived that a finite network has a strongly
connected spanning subnetwork which has an Eulerian path or cycle if and only if there exists an way of
bypass rewiring to guarantee extreme robustness of the finite network for every combination of removed
nodes; Eulerian networks are extremely robust for every combination of removed nodes.
If the Internet topology has a spanning subnetwork which has an Eulerian path or cycle like Compuserve
topology in Fig. 4, the Internet can be extremely robust against breakdown of routers (nodes) since links of a
broken router on the Internet can be bypass-rewired by an engineer or equipment. Therefore, it is suggested
that bypass rewiring equipment and routers be implemented and deployed on the Internet. In addition,
variations on bypass rewiring theory including optimal bypass rewiring algorithms and more applications to
many fields like electric circuits and power grids are expected.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: (a) Before removal of the node, one node (circle) and five components (square) are connected. (b) After removal
of the node, the network fragments into five smaller components without bypass rewiring. (c) After removal of the node, the
network fragments into two larger connected components and one smaller out-component with bypass rewiring.
j
k
kp
k
j k j k, ,φ
min( , )
( ), ,j
k
kp
k
j k j k
1
1−φ
max( , )0
1k j
k
kp
k
j k j k− −φ
(a)
j
k
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j
j k j k, ,φ
min( , )
( ), ,k
j
jp
j
j k j k
1
1−φ
max( , )0
1j k
j
jp
j
j k j k− −φ
(b)
Figure 2: (a) A schematic diagram to calculate the probability that a randomly chosen in-link originates from a small in-
component [square] with random bypass rewiring under removal of a node. (b) A schematic diagram to calculate the probability
that a randomly chosen out-link leads to a small out-component [square] with random bypass rewiring under removal of a node.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3: The size of the largest SCC (strongly connected component) with respect to the number of removed nodes under
failures [circles (plus signs)] and attacks [squares (crosses)] without (with) random bypass rewiring. The solid lines are for
numerically calculated Ss with respect to N(1 − φ) from Eqs. (4), (6a), (6b), (9a), and (9b) on an infinite directed random
network with the same degree distribution. (a) On the directed network randomly generated by the configuration model with
in-degree distribution pin,j ∼ j
−3, out-degree distribution pout,k ∼ k
−3, N = 20000 nodes, and M = 61438 links where j
and k are almost uncorrelated. (b) On the directed network randomly generated by the configuration model with in-degree
distribution p′
in,j = pin,j , out-degree distribution p
′
out,k
= pout,k, N = 20000 nodes, and M = 61438 links where each node has
in-degree equal to the out-degree (p′
j,k
= 0 for j 6= k). Two straight lines for random bypass rewiring are overlapped.
A B
CD
E F G
H
I
J
K
1
2
3
4
5 6 7 8
9
10
11
12
Figure 4: Compuserve topology, a part of the Internet topology, in U.S. on Jan 2011, publicly available in [23]. The spanning
subnetwork with the bold links has an Eulerian path with L = 12 links. Each number of the bold links denotes the sequential
order of the Eulerian path.
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